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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Roy

Cline Johnson appeals the district court’s award of restitution following a conviction

for aggravated driving

Statement

Of The

Roy

under the inﬂuence.

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Cline Johnson was charged with aggravated driving under the inﬂuence in Violation

0f Idaho Code section 18-8006.
to Clarence

(R., pp. 21-22.)

The

state alleged that

he caused serious injuries

Knight Junior while driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol.

(Id.)

Johnson entered a

guilty plea in accordance with a plea agreement. (R., pp. 24-39, 42-45.)

At a sentencing
180 days.” (TL,

hearing, the prosecution requested that the court “reserve restitution for

p. 7, Ls. 17-22.)

In a

judgment entered July

14,

2017, the

district court

did so.

49-5 1 .)

(R., pp.

On March

14,

restitution, attaching

2018, Mr. Knight, through private counsel,

an afﬁdavit, police records, medical records and

(R., pp. 62-87.) In the afﬁdavit,

his truck, that

moved
bills,

the district court for

and correspondence.

he stated that he was a pedestrian when Johnson struck him with

he had only recently learned that Johnson had been convicted, that he suffered a

traumatic brain injury

When he was

struck

by Johnson, and

that

he did not

recall if

he had been

contacted previously regarding restitution or about providing a Victim impact statement. (R., pp.
77-79.)

In a second afﬁdavit ﬁled roughly a

homeless

after

month

later,

Mr. Knight stated that he was brieﬂy

he was struck by Johnson and released from the hospital;

2017, he was incarcerated

Canyon County

that,

and was unable

October

10,

and

he was currently incarcerated by the Idaho Department 0f Corrections.

that

at the

Jail

0n 0r about
to post

bond;

(R., pp. 97-99.)

He

again articulated the nature of his injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, and stated that

he had incurred more than $100,000 in medical

The
At

28.)

district court

bills.

(Id.)

held a restitution hearing 0n June 27, 2018.

that hearing, Johnson’s attorney

made two

(ﬂ generally

Tr., pp. 14-

preliminary objections t0 restitution.

First,

he

argued that because Mr. Knight was not a party t0 the criminal action, he did not have standing to
request restitution.

(TL, p. 16, L. 13

—

Asked

p. 17, L. 8.)

if

she had a View 0n the issue, the

prosecutor responded that Johnson’s attorney had “a valid point.” (TL, p. 17. Ls. 9-16.) Neither
the prosecutor nor Mr. Knight provided any explanation

the prosecutor’s ofﬁce.

why

the motion

was not ﬁled through

Relying 0n Idaho Code section 19-5304(6), Which provides, in

part, that

Victims have the right t0 present evidence in support 0f restitution, the district court determined

that the hearing could continue.

(Tr., p. 17, L.

17

—

Second, Johnson’s attorney

p. 18, L. 11.)

objected that the district court reserved restitution for a period of 180 days but
restitution after that period

recognized

so.

its

discretion t0 consider restitution after sentencing and exercised

district court

submitted with his

initial

then turned to the merits 0f restitution.

The
its

district court

discretion t0

do

—

p. 21, L.

1;

In addition t0 medical bills

afﬁdavit showing expenses of $32,994.10 (R., pp. 80-84), Mr. Knight

submitted additional medical

bills at the

hearing showing expenses 0f $68,671.54

Conﬁdential Record Appeal, pp.

whether he would concede that these medical

1

(TL, p. 18, Ls. 12-16.)

(TL, p. 18, Ls. 17-20.)

The

11

had already passed.

was considering

bills

1-9), for a total

(Tr., p. 20, L.

0f $101,665.64.1

Asked

were reasonably incurred by Mr. Knight,

For reasons that are unclear, Mr. Knight’s attorney repeatedly stated that Mr. Knight was

seeking $104,000 in restitution.
(R., p. 143.)

(Tr., p. 20, Ls. 6-7.)

The

district court

awarded $101,665.64.

Johnson’s attorney stated, “I think
not had a chance to review the

we have

bills that

a pretty good record 0f it,” but also noted that he had

had just been submitted. (TL,

Johnson’s attorney stated that he would

make any

additional brieﬁng to the court. (TL, p. 26, L. 21

At
and

that

p. 24, L.

22 —

objections t0 the claim of economic loss in

— p.

27, L. 8; p. 28, Ls. 3-8.)

the hearing, Mr. Knight’s attorney represented t0 the court that Johnson

Mr. Knight executed a

$100,000.

(TL, p. 19, L. 2

—

civil settlement

p. 25, L. 6.)

was insured

with Johnson’s insurer for the policy limit of

p. 20, L. 7; p. 21, L.

20 —

p. 22, L. 12; p. 24, Ls. 13-21.)

But Mr.

Knight’s attorney argued that the insurance payment was irrelevant to restitution both because

Idaho Code section 19-5304 so provided (TL,

p. 19, L.

2 —

p. 20, L. 7; p. 21, L.

20 —

p. 23,

and because the settlement amount was for general damages not compensable through
such as pain and suffering, as well as
(T12, p. 21, Ls.

The

lost

wages

that

Mr. Knight did not request in

L3),

restitution,

restitution

2-19; p. 25, Ls. 7-15).

district court

asked for additional brieﬁng addressing both the

effect, if any,

of the

insurance payment on the availability and amount of restitution, as well as addressing any
objections from Johnson’s counsel regarding the medical bills submitted t0 establish economic

(TL, p. 26, L. 21

loss.

In his brieﬁng

— p.

27, L. 8.)

0n the

latter issue,

Johnson stated

challenge the legitimacy 0f these additional medical

[sic]

its

he “does not ﬁnd a basis to

Thereby the Defendant acknowledging

a claim 0f $101665.64 dollars in out-of—pocket loss.” (R., p. 123.)

effect

in

bills.

that

of the insurance payment, Johnson argued that
discretion, consider in determining the

it

was a

t0 the relevance

and

factor that the district court could,

amount of restitution

disregard the insurance payment Without thereby abusing

As

its

t0 award, but that

discretion.

it

could also

(R., pp.

123-25.)

Johnson also attached What he stated was a copy 0f the Release of A11 Claims allegedly
completed by Mr. Knight as part of his settlement with Johnson’s

Mr. Knight continued
law, renders an insurance

t0 argue that Idaho

payment and

Code

insurer. (R., pp. 127-28.)

section 19-5304(2), along With Idaho case

civil settlement irrelevant to

an award of restitution.

(R.,

pp. 115-21, 131-35.)

The

district court

ordered restitution in the amount 0f $101,665.64.

(R., pp. 136-44.)

It

held that the delay in considering restitution was reasonably necessary in light 0f Mr. Knight’s

medical condition and circumstances following his injury.

(R., pp. 142-43.)

insurance payment and associated settlement were factors that
in determining

preclude

it

it

it

could, in

its

It

also held that the

discretion, consider

Whether restitution was appropriate and in What amount, but that they did not

from exercising

its

discretion to

award the

then did. (R., pp. 138-42.)

Johnson timely appealed.

(R., pp. 145-48.)

restitution requested

by Mr. Knight, which

IS SUE

on appeal

Johnson

states the issue

Did the

district court err

to Clarence

as:

by ordering Mr. Johnson

t0

pay $101,665.64

restitution

Knight?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Johnson
restitution to

failed to establish that the district court

Mr. Knight?

abused

its

discretion in

awarded

ARGUMENT
Johnson Has Not Established That The
A.

Court Erred

BV Awarding Restitution As

It

Did

Introduction

Johnson argues
restitution. In

First,

was

District

that the district court erred in three

each case, he

fails t0

he argues that the

show

district court

and submitted evidence and argument

Though

is

restitution, that fact did not

enter a restitution

award.

undesirable,” Idaho

Code

Who moved

the district court t0

that

restitution

section 19-5304 requires the district court t0

ﬁled by the prosecutor, and speciﬁcally provides that the Victim

Victim, does not condition such an

did because there

necessary.

of

award

restitution for

may present

for

evidence

I.C. § 19-5304(2).

Second, he argues that the

it

award

award on a prior motion

restitution

when

it

would be “inappropriate or

loss suffered

loss.

pay

in the court’s consideration

economic

ofeconomic

t0

the district court 0f its statutorily granted jurisdiction t0

Absent a ﬁnding

by a

him

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-13.)

in support.

was minimally involved

somehow rob

ordered

lacked jurisdiction t0 award restitution because

restitution

true that the prosecutor

it

that the district court erred.

the Victim, Mr. Knight, and not the prosecutor,

it

ways When

was

district court

abused

its

discretion

by considering

restitution

allegedly n0 basis for the court to conclude that the delay

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)

The

district court

was

recognized that Section 19-5304

provides discretion t0 consider restitution at “such later date [after sentencing] as

necessary by the court,” LC. § 19-5304(6), and found as a matter of fact that

it

deemed

was necessary and

appropriate t0 consider restitution in this case based on Mr. Knight’s medical condition and

circumstances following Johnson’s criminal conduct. Substantial evidence supports that ﬁnding.

Third, he argues that the district court erred in determining the

owes.

amount of restitution he

This argument takes three forms: (1) that the district court was required t0 set-off the

insurance payment against any restitution award (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-21); (2) that the

Release barred any restitution entirely (Appellant’s
bills

brief, pp. 21-23);

and

(3) that the

medical

submitted by Mr. Knight were inadequate to establish economic loss (Appellant’s brief, pp.

24-25).

None 0f

In fact, With respect t0 each, Johnson took

these claims has been preserved.

But the claims also

precisely the opposition position below.

fail

on the

merits.

Contrary to

Johnson’s argument, neither Idaho Code section 19-5304 nor Idaho case law require that a
defendant’s restitution liability be reduced

defendant’s insurer.

irrelevant to the

T0

the

district

court t0

t0 the Victim

by the

the contrary, Section 19-5304 suggests that insurance proceeds are

amount of a

some circumstances, be

by the amount of a payment made

restitution order. But,

even

appropriate, Johnson provided

determine that

acknowledges, Idaho case law

is

it

if a set-off for

such payments would, in

below none 0f the evidence necessary

was appropriate

in

this

case.

Next, as Johnson

clear that a settlement does not preclude restitution.

provides n0 reason to abandon that case law, Which

is

for

He

consistent With case law in the vast

majority ofjurisdictions to consider the issue. Finally, he claims that the medical bills submitted

by Mr. Knight do not

establish an

economic

Knight has not and will not pay those
is

also irrelevant whether

establish an

economic

loss

it

does.

even

bills.

As

if they

loss because the record allegedly reﬂects that

Johnson

is

Mr.

incorrect that the record so reﬂects, but

it

Section 19-5304(1)(a) deﬁnes “economic loss,” the bills

have not been and Will not be paid by Mr. Knight.

This Court should therefore afﬁrm the

district court’s restitution order.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“The decision whether

and

in

State V. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211,

court’s discretion.”

“Abuse of

to order restitution

discretion review involves three questions:

What amount

is

committed

296 P.3d 412, 417
(1)

to the trial

App. 2013).

(Ct.

whether the lower court rightly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries 0f such
discretion and consistently With any legal standards applicable t0 speciﬁc choices; and (3)

Whether the court reached

its

decision

by an exercise 0f reason.”

State V. Ellington, 157 Idaho

480, 485, 337 P.3d 639, 644 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

factual

ﬁndings With regard t0 restitution Will not be disturbed

evidence.”

State V. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885,

marks omitted).

“Substantial evidence

is

if

“The

district court’s

supported by substantial

292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013)

(internal quotation

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept t0 support a conclusion.” Li.

C.

The

District

Court

Had Jurisdiction T0 Order Johnson T0 Pay Restitution

Johnson argues that the

district court

“lacked jurisdiction to consider and grant the motion

requesting [restitution], since neither the Victim nor his private lawyer had standing to ﬁle

motions in Mr. Johnson’s criminal case.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)

jurisdiction to order restitution

not conditioned in any

is statutory, is

and does not disappear when a Victim submits evidence
irrelevant to the district court’s jurisdiction t0

award

in support

restitution

But the

way 0n

district court’s

a motion by a party,

of restitution.

It is

therefore

Whether Mr. Knight and his

attorney had standing to ﬁle motions, or Whether the prosecutor requested restitution.

While

“[i]t is

generally recognized that courts of criminal jurisdiction have no

power or

authority to direct reparations or restitution t0 a crime Victim in the absence of a statutory

provision t0 such effect,” State V. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App.

2002), “[c]rimina1

restitution

2016).

by

trial

courts are cloaked with subject matter jurisdiction relative t0 orders for

statutory grant.”

State V. Keys, 160 Idaho 95, 97,

369 P.3d 313, 315

(Ct.

App.

“Idaho’s restitution statute provides that a court shall order a defendant found guilty 0f

any crime which

an economic loss t0 the Victim t0 make restitution to the Victim.”

results in

Richmond, 137 Idaho
district court therefore

Even granting

at 37,

had

43 P.3d

796 (emphasis added)

at

(citing

LC.

§ 19-5304(2)).

The

statutory jurisdiction t0 enter a restitution order.

the preliminary conclusion that Mr. Knight lacked standing to

restitution, the district court

was not somehow deprived of

its

move

for

Nothing in

statutory authority.

Section 19-5304 suggests that the district court’s power t0 consider and order restitution
contingent 0n the prosecutor ﬁrst ﬁling a motion for restitution.

The

statute is

requiring that restitution be ordered absent a ﬁnding that such an order

inappropriate.

power

LC.

§ 19-5304(2).

t0 order restitution

makes no

power

statute

does not in any

on a motion from the prosecutor, the

ﬁle a motion for restitution
district court’s

Because the

is

way

difference whether Mr. Knight

had standing

to

mandatory,

undesirable or

condition the court’s

fact that the prosecutor did not

irrelevant t0 the district court’s jurisdiction.

t0 order restitution is not contingent

is

Likewise, because the

0n the ﬁling 0f any motion

move

is

for restitution.

A

at all,

it

district court

does not lose the power to take a certain action simply because a non-party attempts t0 ﬁle a

motion asking

it

to take that action.

m

State V. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 597, 261 P.3d 853,

874

(201 1) (where presentence investigator submitted a “motion” asking district court to exclude the

defendant’s parents from a presentence investigation interview and the district court did so,

ﬁnding no reversible error though the presentence investigator had “n0 standing
motion

to the court”).

t0

make

a

Johnson

proposition that “the burden

economic

153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273 (2013), for the

cites a single case, State V. Straub,

[is]

loss actually suffered

on the State

by a given

[as

opposed, presumably, to the Victim] t0 prove

Victim, in accordance with the statute.”

(emphasis in original).) Str_aub does not suggest that a

brief, p. 11

district court is

(Appellant’s

powerless to

consider evidence of economic loss submitted by the Victim, 0r powerless t0 order restitution
absent a motion by the prosecutor.

Str_aub addressed

both the scope 0f an appeal waiver and the

propriety of a restitution order including future lost

premiums.

Li. at 885-90,

292 P.3d

at

wages and

276-81. With respect to the

future medical insurance

which

latter,

is

presumably the

portion of the opinion Johnson considers relevant, the Idaho Supreme Court held that while 10st

wages and medical expenses incurred
wages and

future medical insurance

could not be awarded as restitution.

as 0f the time of restitution could be recovered, future lost

premiums did not
Li. at 887-90,

constitute actual

292 P.3d

at

economic

loss

and so

278-81. Nothing in the opinion

suggests that the district court cannot base a restitution order on evidence 0f economic loss

submitted by the Victim, or that the

cannot order restitution absent a motion by the

district court

prosecutor.

Section 19-5304 also explicitly contravenes the idea that

may submit

it is

evidence in support of restitution. The statute provides

only the prosecutor

that:

“Economic

who

loss shall

be

based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted t0 the court by the prosecutor, defendant,
Victim or presentence investigator.” LC. § 19-5304(6). While Johnson

may be

correct that this

provision does not create “standing for the Victim” t0 ﬁle motions (Appellant’s brief, p. 10),

clearly

and unambiguously permits the Victim

district court.

entitled

by

Even

statute to

if

t0

it

submit evidence regarding economic loss t0 the

Mr. Knight should not have styled the submission as a “motion,” he was

submit evidence of economic loss and the

10

district court

was authorized

to

consider that evidence t0 determine Whether a restitution order

determined that a restitution order was appropriate,

dependent 0n the

state

move

power

to

award

for restitution.

power

Having

appropriate.

was not

t0 order restitution

having ﬁrst ﬁled a motion.

Next, though Mr. Knight’s standing t0
court’s

its

was

it,

move

for restitution is irrelevant t0 the district

Johnson has also not established

While

that

Mr. Knight lacked standing

to

certainly true that, as a general matter, only the parties t0 a case

it is

are entitled to ﬁle motions, Idaho courts have considered

criminal cases where the non-party

was a

and resolved motions by non-parties

real party in interest.

in

In the context of motions to

m

exonerate a bond under the Idaho Bail Act, for instance, Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly

considered the merits 0f motions ﬁled by non—parties

m,
621

posted the bonds.

145 Idaho 993, 188 P.3d 935 (Ct. App. 2008); State

(Ct.

1998).

Who

App. 2005); State

V.

Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111 P.3d

Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 952 P.2d 1249

Though Idaho Criminal Rule 46

may move

V.

the court t0 rescind

its

currently provides that the person

forfeiture 0r to exonerate

through 2009 did not. Compare I.C.R. 46(g) (2009)

ﬂ

it,

consider a motion ﬁled by a non-party
explicitly authorizing the court to

22(7),

movant

successful, one

Reg’l Med.

interest is

Who

so.

is

is

Ctr., Ltd. V.

entitle

the person

I.C.R. 46(k)(1) (2010).

ﬂ, gg, Abracadabra,

posted a bond

it is

In considering

sometimes appropriate

Both the Idaho Constitution, Article

I,

Section

by crime.

Will be entitled t0 the beneﬁts 0f the action if

actually and substantially interested in the subject matter.”

Bd. 0f

to

131 Idaho 113, 952 P.2d 1249

Victims t0 restitution for losses caused

Who

App.

a real party in interest, even absent a statute 0r rule

as real party in interest).

and Section 19-5304(2)

“A real party in

do

who

Who

(Ct.

the version of that rule in effect

such motions and appeals, these courts apparently recognized that

(designating

m, gg,

Comm’rs 0f Ada

11

Ctv.,

St.

Luke’s

146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683, 687

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
entitled t0 the

As

the Victim 0f Johnson’s crime, Mr. Knight

was

beneﬁts of any restitution and was both actually and substantially interested in the

subj ect matter.

Finally,

The

district court therefore

did not err by considering his motion.

that “the district court effectively

Johnson suggests

bestowed upon private

counsel the role of the public prosecutor,” Violating his due process rights because that supposed

special prosecutor,

Mr. Knight’s attorney, allegedly had an

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.)

primarily because

economic
it

do

loss

so.

it

The

interest in the restitution proceedings.

district court “effectively”

did so, according t0 Johnson,

accepted evidence from Mr. Knight, through an attorney, regarding

and awarded

restitution

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

though the prosecutor had ﬁled n0 motion requesting that

12-13 (“the district court exceeded

authority

its

when

it

considered and granted the restitution motion by counsel”).)

The

assertion that the district court appointed a special prosecutor

in another guise, that the district court

the prosecutor.

His claim

is

that

was powerless

t0

award

district court

As

was powerless

to

simply the assertion,

restitution absent a

motion from

Mr. Knight’s attorney must have been appointed as a special

prosecutor because the district court awarded restitution, Which

motion by a prosecutor.

is

discussed above, there

award

n0 support

is

restitution absent a

Nor does Johnson provide any support

for the

it

could only have done on

for the proposition that the

motion from a prosecutor.

View

that his

due process rights would be

violated even if the district court had appointed Mr. Knight’s attorney as a special prosecutor.

Johnson claims that Mr. Knight’s attorney was

and was therefore

to receive a percentage

interested. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12).

0f the restitution recovery

In support of the

View

that appointing

Young

an

interested special prosecutor

may

ex

481 U.S. 787 (1987), a case in which the Supreme Court held that

rel.

Vuitton

et Fils S.A.,

constitute a

due process Violation, Johnson

12

cites

V.

U.S.

Where an individual 0r

entity is subj ect to a court order

counsel for the individual 0r entity that

is

and

is

beneﬁted by the court order

special prosecutor t0 prosecute the alleged contempt. Li. at

that is the

beneﬁciary of a court order

may

alleging a Violation 0f that order”).

discretion that

exercised

is

largely unsupervised

A

by the

prosecutor

allegedly in contempt of that order,

809 (holding

appointed as a

that “counsel for a party

not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action

In so holding, the Court

by prosecutors

may not be

emphasized the extent of the

in criminal actions, potentially subject to abuse

and

trial court:

exercises

considerable

discretion

such

matters

in

as

the

determination of Which persons should be targets 0f investigation, What methods

0f investigation should be used, What information Will be sought as evidence,

which persons should be charged with what
utilized as Witnesses,

Whether

offenses,

which persons should be
and the terms on which

to enter into plea bargains

they will be established, and Whether any individuals should be granted immunity.
Li. at 807.

Mg

is

Most

inapplicable to this case for a variety 0f reasons.

already been prosecuted and convicted, and

obviously, Johnson had

was not being prosecuted

for

any new crime.

Mr. Knight, through his attorney, was pursuing restitution t0 which he was entitled by

Instead,

Idaho law, by submitting evidence as he was entitled to do by

proceeding that

is

essentially civil.

E

State V.

statute,

through a restitution

Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 920, 393 P.3d 576, 580

(2017) (holding that because restitution proceedings “are civil in nature,” the fundamental error
doctrine

does not apply).

Relatedly,

restitution

proceedings d0 not involve the sort of

discretionary judgments affecting a criminal defendant that led the Court in

appointment 0f an interested special prosecutor.

He

did not choose

Who

t0 target for investigation,

13

to reject the

Mr. Knight’s attorney merely assisted in the

presentation of evidence of economic loss and provided argument

so.

Mg

Who

when asked by the Court

to charge,

what charges

to ﬁle,

t0

do

What

plea offers to make, or otherwise exercise the considerable

power possessed by prosecutors over

the course 0f criminal proceedings.

Finally, contrary t0 Johnson’s assertion, there is

n0 evidence

Mr.

in the record that

Knight’s attorney was t0 receive a percentage of any restitution award. In support, Johnson cites
a footnote 0f a brief submitted by Mr. Knight below. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (citing R., p. 133 n.

1).)

That footnote

states

only that the insurance proceeds Mr. Knight had already received were

subj ect to attorney fees, not that a restitution

The

district court

had

award would be

statutory jurisdiction t0

not contingent on any motion being ﬁled.

relied

It

Mr. Knight, Which evidence Mr. Knight was
prosecutor did not ﬁle a motion for restitution

restitution, as is the fact that

The

D.

District

award

restitution,

which

on evidence 0f economic

entitled

is

as well. (R., p. 133 n. 1.)

by

statute to submit.

jurisdiction

was

loss submitted

The

irrelevant to the district court’s

by

fact that the

power

to

award

Mr. Knight had the assistance of private counsel.

Court Did Not Abuse

Its

Discretion

BV

Considering Restitution After

Sentencing
Idaho’s restitution statute expresses a preference that the district court order restitution at
the time of sentencing but permits restitution t0 be ordered at a later date if deemed necessary

by

the court:

Restitution orders shall be entered

by

the court at the time of sentencing 0r such

deemed necessary by the court. Economic loss shall be based upon
preponderance of evidence submitted t0 the court by the prosecutor,

later date as

the

defendant, Victim or presentence investigator.

LC.
to

§

19-5304(6) (emphasis added). “The statutory language clearly gives the court discretion as

when

it

may order restitution,”

2010), but the district court must

State V. Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722,

make

a ﬁnding that the delay

14

239 P.3d 825, 827

was reasonably

(Ct.

necessary.

App.
State

149 Idaho 758, 763, 241 P.3d

V. Jensen,

abused
court

its

discretion

by awarding

made n0 ﬁnding

.

.

.

1,

6 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the

district court

where

“[t]he district

restitution nearly six years after sentencing

that the delay

was reasonably necessary

for the processing 0f the

request for restitution”).

At

the sentencing hearing

on July

reserve restitution for a period of 180 days.

district court

restitution

2017, the prosecutor asked the

(TL, p.

7, Ls. 17-22.)

district court to

Johnson did not

object.

The

then granted the request. (R., p. 50.) Mr. Knight submitted evidence in support of

0n March

14,

2018, sixty—three days after the expiration of that 180-day period. (R.,

Johnson then objected

pp. 62-87.)

14,

the 180-day period.

that the evidence

(TL, p. 18, Ls. 12-16

180 days to pursue a restitution hearing.

I

had been submitted

(“When he was
would note

sentenced,

after the expiration

my

that this is at least

of

Court gave

client, the

two months

late in its

ﬁling from that order.”).

Despite Johnson’s objection below, the

restitution

and found

that the delay in

district court

recognized

doing so was necessary.

submitted an afﬁdavit in Which he stated

that, after

its

discretion t0 consider

(R., pp. 142-43.)

Mr. Knight

he was struck by Johnson, he had been

hospitalized with a head injury, that he learned that Johnson

was convicted only

recently before

submitting evidence 0f economic loss to the district court, and that he did not recall being
contacted by the prosecutor’s ofﬁce.

month

later,

(R., pp. 77-79.)

In another afﬁdavit submitted roughly a

he reiterated that he had been hospitalized With a head

injury,

subsequently homeless, and that he had been incarcerated since October 10, 2017.

99.)

The presentence

report reﬂects that Mr. Knight

of sentencing, necessitating the

initial

that

(R., pp. 97-

was receiving medical treatment

180-day extension t0 request

restitution,

he was

at the

time

Which Johnson

did not contest below, and that the investigator had difﬁculty contacting Mr. Knight, stating that

15

the mailbox associated With one telephone

number

available for Mr. Knight

had not been

set up,

while another number had been disconnected. (Conﬁdential Record Appeal, pp. 12-13.) Based

0n Mr. Knight’s

injuries

and circumstances following Johnson’s criminal conduct, the

court concluded that the delay

ability t0

work with

was reasonably necessary

the prosecutor

Johnson claims that the

0n

arguments in support. (Appellant’s
First,

he suggests

that the delay

that,

court thereby abused

brief, pp.

because

it

Mr. Knight was hampered in his

(R., pp. 142-43.)

restitution.

district

as

its

was not

making

the prosecutor, but Mr. Knight,

three

Who

asserted

in support, the district court

not permitted to conclude that the delay in considering restitution

is

discretion,

13-16?)

was reasonably necessary and presented evidence

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (“the record

district

was reasonably

was

necessary.

clear that the prosecutor never represented to the district

court that an extension beyond the 180-day period previously ordered

was

either warranted or

reasonably necessary”).) But just as nothing in Section 19-5304 requires that the prosecutor ﬁle

may

a motion for restitution before the district court

the district court

may

restrict

it

it,

nothing in that statute suggests that

only conclude that a delay in ordering restitution was reasonably necessary

based 0n evidence submitted by the prosecutor.
conclude that

order

was necessary

The

statute requires

only that the

district court

t0 order restitution at a date later than sentencing;

it

does not

the district court to considering only arguments and evidence for that conclusion

submitted by the prosecutor.

2

Johnson correctly recognizes

that the question

ordering restitution after (rather than

about whether the

district court

at)

abused

sentencing
its

whether the
is

acted properly in

district court

not a jurisdictional question, but a question

“The time limits
from a restitution

discretion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)

§ 19—5304(6) and (10) [addressing the time to request relief
do not affect loss 0f subject matter jurisdiction, but, rather, set the standards for the court’s
exercise of its authority.” Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762, 241 P.3d at 5.

found in LC.
order]
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Next, Johnson argues that because Mr. Knight was incarcerated in October of 2017,

“even

if the prosecutor’s

ofﬁce

with Mr. Knight

lost contact

at

some

point, this record

shows

Canyon County Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce had located him by October 0f 2017.” (Appellant’s

the

p. 15 (footnote omitted).)

2017,

it

While the record reﬂects

that

that

brief,

Mr. Knight was arrested in October 0f

does not reﬂect that the prosecutor’s ofﬁce “located” him in the sense that anyone

associated

him With Johnson’s

criminal case and recognized that he

obviously not true that the particular prosecutor in Johnson’s
coordinator, or anyone else

who had been

was Johnson’s
case,

the

Victim.

It is

Victim Witness

involved in Johnson’s criminal case would have

recognized that the Victim of Johnson’s criminal conduct was in custody merely because Mr.

Knight had been

arrested.

Mr. Knight testiﬁed that he learned that Johnson had been convicted

only recently before he submitted evidence in support 0f restitution.

(R., p. 78.)

That

fact,

coupled With the evidence that Mr. Knight had been previously unreachable and the sheer
improbability that someone involved in Johnson’s criminal case

that

to recognize

Mr. Knight had been arrested and was Johnson’s Victim, strongly suggests that he was not

recognized as Johnson’s Victim

Last,

and according

when he was

to Johnson,

contains no evidence that Mr. Knight’s

arrested.

“[m]ore importantly,” he suggests that “the record

[sic]

had ever sought

regarding restitution, even after he discovered Mr. Johnson’s

t0 represent

him.” (Appellant’s

district court’s

“not tied” t0

its

ﬁnding

that

brief, p.

t0

he submitted his

that

own

was

work with

the prosecution

DUI and

hired a personal attorney

As

a result, he contends, the

work with

ruling that the delay in ordering restitution

restitution before

t0

16 (emphasis in 0riginal).)

Mr. Knight was unable

The record contains no evidence
0n

would just happen

the prosecution

on

restitution is

necessary. (Id.)

Mr. Knight attempted to work With the prosecution

evidence of economic loss precisely because, as the

17

evidence suggests, his injuries and circumstances following Johnson’s criminal conduct
difﬁcult or impossible for the prosecutor t0 reach him, inform

With him on

was

restitution

That

restitution.

exactly

is

Why

conviction, and

it

work

the district court concluded that the delay in

The record does not reﬂect

necessary.

him of the

made

Mr. Knight worked with the

that

prosecution 0n restitution after discovering that Johnson was convicted because he quickly
thereafter submitted his

own

evidence regarding restitution, Which the

There was n0 delay to be explained or justiﬁed

acted 0n.

after

district court

promptly

he learned 0f Johnson’s

conviction.

The

district court

after sentencing,

exercise

its

recognized the discretionary nature 0f its decision to consider restitution

found as a matter of

discretion to consider restitution.

reasonable necessity of the delay
did not abuse

E.

fact that

its

is

it

was necessary

The

in this case,

district court’s factual

and determined

t0

ﬁnding regarding the

supported by substantial and competent evidence.

It

therefore

discretion.

Johnson Failed To Preserve

Any

Other Challenges To The District Court’s Restitution

Order

A

party

may

not allege error by the district court 0n grounds that were not advanced

before the district court.

E

State V. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,

_,

439 P.3d 1267, 1270-71

“[B]oth the issue and the party’s position 0n the issue must be raised before the

(2019).

court for

it

to

be properly preserved for appeal.”

Li.

complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced
reversible.” State V. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226,

Johnson argues 0n appeal

In addition, “one

in.

may

not successfully

In other words, invited errors are not

706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985).

that the district court

was

legally obligated to set—off the

amount of the insurance proceeds received by Mr. Knight against any

18

trial

restitution

award

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-21); that the civil settlement signed

by Mr. Knight bars any

restitution

order (Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-23); and that the medical bills failed to establish any economic
loss because

Mr. Knight’s attorney allegedly stated

that

Mr. Knight had not paid and did not

intend to pay those bills (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25).

Johnson has not preserved any of those arguments. In

fact,

he explicitly disavowed each

0f them below.

District Court Was Legally Required T0
Amount Of The Insurance Payment Against A Restitution Award,
And Waived Any Argument That The Civil Settlement Bars A Restitution Award

Johnson Waived The Argument That The

1.

Set-Off The

There

is

Ls. 13-21), nor

no dispute
is

that

Mr. Knight received $100,000 from Johnson’s insurer

there any dispute that Mr. Knight signed a Release of A11 Claims related t0

Johnson’s criminal conduct (R., pp. 127-28, 132).
that while

restitution,

the insurance

it

After brieﬁng, the district court concluded

payment may be an appropriate

was not required

t0 provide

(R., pp. 140-42.)

that “[t]he district court’s conclusion that the [insurance]

is

statute.”

consider in awarding

factor to

any set—off against Johnson’s

the Release did not bar any claim for restitution.

award

(Tr., p. 24,

On

restitution liability,

and

appeal, Johnson argues

payment does not

limit the [restitution]

contrary t0 Idaho Court 0f Appeals precedent, and contrary t0 language of the restitution

(Appellant’s brief, p. 17.)

He

further argues

was binding and precluded Mr. Knight from
awarding him for his settled losses.”
district court

on appeal

that “the settlement

petitioning the district court for a restitution order

(Appellant’s brief, p. 22.)

That

is,

he argues that the

was required by Idaho law—both case law and statute—to consider

payment and apply

it

agreement

the insurance

against any restitution award, and that the settlement barred any restitution

award.

19

But Johnson took precisely the opposite positions below. Before the
section of his brieﬁng titled

“THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO CONSIDER THE

INSURANCE PAYMENT TO THE VICTIM,”
discretion Whether or not to consider the insurance

award.

(R., pp.

district court, in a

Johnson argued that the

payment and apply a

123-24 (capitalization and bold font in original).)

district court

set-off t0

any

had

restitution

While he urged the

district

court t0 exercise this supposed discretion, he explicitly stated that “if a Court in exercising

discretion does not apply the insurance [t0 a restitution award] such determination

of discretion.”

He

(R., p. 124.)

further stated that, “It

is

is

its

not an abuse

the defense position that this court does

have the absolute discretion on whether to consider the $100,000 dollar insurance payment in
regarding a restitution request.”

that the insurance

(R., p.

125 (emphasis added).)

payment was a relevant

factor that the district court could consider

determining whether to award restitution, but the

would not thereby abuse

its

discretion.

has taken 0n appeal, that the

and apply

it

district court

That position

district court

Johnson’s position below was

was

is

When

could decline to d0 so and

it

ﬂatly inconsistent With the View Johnson

legally required t0 consider the insurance

toward any restitution award, with no discretion

t0

payment

do otherwise. (Appellant’s

brief,

p. 17.)

Likewise, With respect t0 the effect 0f the settlement 0n any restitution order, Johnson
stated

below

that

he “recognize[d] that a separate

separate order for restitution”

(R., p. 125),

View advanced by Mr. Knight below

civil settlement

does not bar

this

Court from a

thereby clearly and unambiguously endorsing the

(R., pp.

131-35).

Now, 0n

appeal, he argues that the

settlement release barred the district court from a separate order for restitution.

brief, p. 22.)
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(Appellant’s

Johnson cannot argue below that the

district court

insurance payment to any restitution award and that

do so

it is

had discretion Whether

“not an abuse 0f discretion” t0 refuse to

123-24), only t0 reverse course and argue 0n appeal, after the district court took

(R., pp.

exactly that position (R., pp. 140-41), that the district court erred

with Mr. Knight below that a

civil settlement

by doing

by doing

Establish

T0
$32,994.10

establish

does not bar a restitution order only to reverse

Any Argument

economic
and

loss,

later, at

totaling $68,671.54 (Conﬁdential

that the district

That Mr. Knight’s Medical Bills Failed T0

Mr. Knight

initially

submitted medical

bills

Record Appeal, pp.

1-9), for

L. 6.) Johnson’s attorney responded that

“we have

a pretty

bills.

(Tn, p. 24, L. 22

district court

restitution, the district court

some grand

stated:

In addition to asking for brieﬁng

could consider the insurance payment

[in

p. 25,

had only just

on the question whether the

When determining

the appropriate

amount of

asked Johnson’s attorney t0 address “Whether you think those 60-

medical expenses] are objectionable and why.” (TL,

When

he addressed the question Whether the medical

“As a

result

0f his

—

good record 0f it,” but he would need

additional time to review the roughly $68,000 in medical bills that Mr. Knight

(Id.)

At the

a total 0f $101,665.64.

asked Johnson’s attorney Whether he would

Mr. Knight had reasonably incurred these medical

disclosed at the hearing.

totaling

the restitution hearing, submitted additional medical bills

restitution hearing, the district court speciﬁcally

some

(id.),

An Economic Loss

(R., pp. 80-83),

stipulate that

agree

Johnson has waived those arguments 0n appeal.

so.

Johnson Waived

2.

Nor can he

so.

course and argue 0n appeal, after the district court took exactly that position

court erred

to apply the

[ML

p. 25, L.

21

bills established

— p.

27, L. 8.)

economic

loss,

he

Knight’s] injuries he incurred certain medical bills resulting in

speciﬁc out-of-pocket economic loss.” (R.,

p. 122.)
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Johnson further stated that he “does not ﬁnd

a basis t0 challenge the legitimacy 0f these [the roughly $60,000 in medical bills disclosed at the

restitution hearing] additional

medical

0f $101665.64 dollars in out-of-pocket

Knight incurred medical

bills

Thereby the Defendant acknowledging

bills.

loss.”

(R., p. 123).

As one would expect

any way

Mr. Knight had not suffered any economic

that

somehow

economic

to establish

Johnson explicitly conceded

“resulting in speciﬁc out-of—pocket

$101,665.64.

in light

loss. Citing

0f that concession,

Johnson’s

[sic]

at

economic loss”

Now, 0n

appeal, Johnson argues that,

Mr. Knight actually suffered n0 economic
t0 Johnson,

loss, or that the

medical

“The undisputed evidence

suffered no economic loss”

(id.) is directly

bills.”

in this case

(Id.)

contradicted

by

That

if

Johnson had not asserted a position below

in

properly

bills

and

shows

that

is so,

according

“Mr. Knight had not paid,

that,

The claim

that

Mr. Knight “actually

below

the admission

that

“incurred certain medical bills resulting in speciﬁc out-of-pocket economic loss”

Even

totaling

loss.” (R., p. 138.)

loss.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.)

any of his medical

to pay,

Mr.

bills failed

brief, the district court therefore

because Mr. Knight’s attorney allegedly represented

and did not intend

that

n0 point did Johnson argue

concluded that “Defendant does not contest the legitimacy of those medical

acknowledges Knight has $101,665.64 in out-of-pocket

a claim

Mr. Knight

(R., p. 122).

that is directly contrary to the position

he has

taken on appeal, he failed t0 provide any argument t0 the district court that Mr. Knight’s medical

bills

were inadequate

t0 establish

Mr. Knight did not intend
“Appellate court review

below.”

exception

t0

is

economic

pay the

loss, either

bills or for

any other reason.

considered.”

State

V.

(E generally R., pp.

122-26.)

limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented

State V. Castreion, 163 Idaho 19, 20,

of fundamental

because his attorney allegedly stated that

error,

Doe,

“issues presented

123

(Ct.

App. 2017). With the

the ﬁrst time

on appeal will not be

407 P.3d 606, 607

Idaho
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370,

for

371,

848

P.2d

428,

429

(1993).

“Because

restitution proceedings

Wisdom, 161 Idaho

apply.”

Knight failed

F.

Even

civil

the fundamental error doctrine does not

in nature,

920, 393 P.3d at 580. Johnson has waived any argument that Mr.

economic

t0 establish

If This

at

are

loss for purposes

Court Addresses The Merits

of restitution.

Of

Johnson’s Arguments Regarding The

And The Sufﬁciency Of The Evidence For Economic
To Establish That The District Court Erred In Determining The
Amount Of Restitution T0 Order
Insurance Payment, The Release,

Loss, Johnson Fails

Because Johnson

failed to preserve the arguments, this

merits of his contentions that the district court

was required

Court should not address the

t0 credit the insurance

payment

against any restitution (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-21); that the settlement agreement barred any

restitution (Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-23);

and

that

Mr. Knight failed

t0 establish

economic

loss

because his attorney allegedly represented that he had not yet paid and did not intend to pay his
medical

But even

bills (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25).

merits 0f those arguments, they

amount of restitution

fail t0

to order.

had not yet paid and perhaps did not intend
question whether there

was not required

Johnson’s insurer.

below

that

pay

Mr. Knight’s attorney represented that he

his medical bills, that fact is irrelevant to the

t0 establish that

loss.

Johnson provides no reason

state,

if the district court

bills

submitted by

t0

a civil settlement does not bar a

abandon

t0 provide a set-off to the restitution

Even

The medical

he incurred medical expenses, Which constitute

Next, in Idaho, as in Virtually every

separate restitution order.

court

to

if

was adequate evidence 0f economic

Mr. Knight were sufﬁcient
loss.

Court disagrees and considers the

establish that the district court erred in determining the

Taking the arguments in reverse order, even

economic

if this

might have done

such a set—off was appropriate.
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that rule.

award
so,

Finally, the district

for the

payment from

Johnson made n0 showing

Johnson Has Not Established That The

1.

District Court Erred

BV Concluding

That

Mr. Knight Suffered Economic Loss
For purposes of

‘economic

restitution,

loss’

includes “direct out-of-pocket losses 0r

expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, but does not include

less tangible

damage such

as pain

and

suffering,

wrongﬁJI death or emotional distress.”

I.C.

§ 19-5304(1)(a).

“Economic

to the court

prosecutor, defendant, Victim 0r presentence investigator.” I.C. § 19-5304(6).

by the

loss shall

be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted

Johnson argues that Mr. Knight failed

t0 establish

economic

loss because his attorney

allegedly represented that “Mr. Knight had not paid, and did not intend to pay, any of his medical
bills.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25.)

First,

though Mr. Knight’s attorney did

state that the

medical

bills

had not been paid

because Mr. Knight had been homeless, could not be located, and was subsequently incarcerated
(TL, p. 23, L. 25

bills.

The

—

p. 24, L. 10),

closest he

came

he did not say that Mr. Knight did not intend to pay the medical

is t0

say that he considered the insurance proceeds that Mr. Knight

received as compensating Mr. Knight for pain, suffering, and lost wages, not t0 compensate for

medical expenses. (TL,
But,

more

p. 25, Ls. 7-15.)

importantly, even if Mr. Knight (0r, his attorney) had stated that Mr. Knight

did not intend to pay the medical

bills, it

would be

irrelevant to the question

court erred in concluding that Mr. Knight suffered economic loss.

economic

loss.

ﬁnancially liable, Whether or not the

bills

establish that he suffered an

which

Those

bills

By

Mr. Knight’s medical

bills

is

the plain terms 0f the statute,

explicitly provides that “medical expenses” constitute an

24

district

reﬂect medical expenses for Which he

have been paid.

incurred an economic loss. LC. § 19-5304(1)(a).

Whether the

economic

loss,

he thereby

A Civil Release Does Not Bar A Restitution Award

2.

The record reﬂects

that

Mr. Knight signed a Release 0f A11 Claims against Johnson.

(R.,

Court 0f Appeals has held that “a

civil

Though he acknowledges

pp. 127-28.)

that the Idaho

settlement does not bar a restitution order” (Appellant’s brief, p. 22 (citing State V. Hamilton,

129 Idaho 938, 943

App. 1997)), Johnson asks

(Ct.

conclusory claim that

it

is

restitution is

Court to reverse that holding. But for a

“outdated and manifestly wrong” (Appellant’s brief, p. 23), he

provides n0 reason that the Court should d0

“Because

this

and parcel

part

application cannot be precluded

so.

by

to

the

system of criminal punishment,

24

the existence of a civil settlement agreement.”

Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused

§

2488. In addition to ensuring that Victims are

whole, “Restitution orders also operate for the beneﬁt 0f the

state, in part

its

C.J.S.

made

because they promote

the rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the criminal law.” State V. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114,

190 P.3d 930, 933

(Ct.

would deprive

restitution hearings

P.2d

at

206

(Ct.

App. 2008).

App. 1997). The

The enforcement of

the state of those beneﬁts.

rule advocated

interest in ensuring that the Victim is fully

settlement

may not

Hamilton, 129 Idaho

by Johnson would

compensated for

loss, as

is

a Victim

Who

accepts a civil

may not

not automatically foreclosed from ordering some restitution

State V. Iniguez, 821 P.2d 194, 197 (Ariz. Ct.

statute.

943, 935

also jeopardize the state’s

simply because the Victim has received some compensation as a result 0f a

the obligation

at

thereby be fully compensated. Li. (“‘because civil damage payments

be fully compensatory, the court

governed by

context of

civil settlements in the

App. 1991)).)

civil action

statute.

25

(quoting

Finally, restitution in Idaho is

That statute does not provide that individuals can contract their

imposed 0n them by the

9”

way

out of

Though Johnson

cites

two cases from Minnesota

to the contrary (Appellant’s brief, pp.

22-23), the rule endorsed in Hamilton—that a private settlement does not bar restitution—is

Widely accepted in other jurisdictions.

2002) (Uniformly, courts hold that a

0f criminal restitution”); Haltom
“allowing a

power

damages

civil court’s

V. State,

civil settlement 0r release

State,

t0 administer criminal punishment”);

and a

gg, Abeﬂa

42 P.3d 1009, 1013 (Wyo.

does not absolve the defendant

832 N.E.2d 969, 972

(Ind.

2005) (holding that

preclude restitution altogether would infringe upon the State’s

civil settlement t0

(“Restitution and civil

other,

V.

ﬂ,

174 A.3d 126, 135 (Vt. 2017)

State V. Blake,

originate within separate systems, are not substitutes for each

award of damages

to a plaintiff does not discharge the criminal court’s

duty or authority t0 consider and order restitution. Therefore, a

civil release

has no bearing 0n the

Reﬂected

in this conclusion is

criminal court’s duty and authority regarding restitution either.

the recognition that restitution, unlike civil damages,

is

not purely aimed at making the Victim

Whole, but also involves additional functions 0f the criminal justice system such as rehabilitation

and deterrence.”).
If assigned t0 the

w,

Court of Appeals,

159 Idaho 233, 241, 358 P.3d 794, 802

previous Court of Appeals decision).

precedent unless that precedent

or overruling that precedent

is

continued injustice.” State

V.

w,
it is,

this issue is

is

(Ct.

governed by stare

decisis.

App. 2015) (applying

E

Caldwell

stare decisis t0 a

“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling

manifestly wrong, has proven over time t0 be unjust or unwise,

necessary t0 vindicate plain, obvious principles 0f law and remedy

Owens, 158 Idaho

1,

4-5,

343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015)

(citing

m

154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013)). Despite his conclusory allegation that

Johnson has not shown

that

Hamilton

is

manifestly wrong. But even if this case

26

is

retained

by

the Idaho

Supreme Court, Johnson has not provided any reason

in Idaho since

abandon the

rule endorsed

1997 and by the vast maj ority of other jurisdictions.

Johnson Has Not Established That The

3.

t0

It

District

Its Discretion When
BV The Amount Of Any

Court Abused

Declined T0 Reduce His Restitution Liability

Insurance Payment

“The decision 0f Whether
0f a

trial court,

policy favoring

and

t0 order restitution,

guided by consideration 0f the factors
full

compensation

crime Victims

t0

in

set forth in

Who

158 Idaho 20, 24, 343 P.3d 49, 53 (Ct. App. 2014).

What amount,

suffer

LC.

is

Within the discretion

19-5304(7) and by the

§

economic

loss.”

State V. Reale,

Idaho Code section 19-5304(7) provides

that:

The

court, in determining

Whether to order restitution and the amount of such

amount 0f economic

restitution, shall consider the

loss sustained

by

the Victim as

a result 0f the offense, the ﬁnancial resources, needs and earning ability of the
defendant, and such other factors as the court
inability to

pay

restitution

by

deems

appropriate.

a defendant shall not be, in and 0f

The immediate

itself,

a reason to

not order restitution.

Mr. Knight

is

the direct Victim of Johnson’s criminal conduct.

‘directly injured Victim’ as the

“person 0r

entity,

Who

suffers

I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i)

economic

(deﬁning

loss 0r injury as the result

of the defendant’s criminal conduct”). As discussed above, he submitted medical

bills totaling

$101,665.64 which established by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered economic
loss in that

amount

below

Mr. Knight suffered economic loss in that amount

that

(R., pp. 80-83;

district court’s discretionary

was

Conﬁdential Record Appeal, pp.

was a

and Johnson conceded

(R., pp. 122-23).

Subject to the

weighing of factors articulated in Section 19-5304(7), Mr. Knight

therefore entitled t0 restitution under Section 19-5304(2).

insurance payment

1-9),

factor that

it

The

district court

held that the

could consider in determining whether and

27

how much

restitution to order, but that

pay restitution and,

in this case,

Johnson argues

was reduced by
17-21.)

He

is

did not require the district court t0 reduce Johnson’s obligation t0

it

it

would

not. (R., pp.

that the district court

was required

the $100,000 paid t0 Mr. Knight

mistaken.

court should consider,

Johnson’s restitution

141-42 (citing

list

No

insurer.

liability

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

such payments as a factor the

less require that the insurance

liability.

conclude that his restitution

by Johnson’s

Section 19-5304(7) does not

much

t0

I.C. § 19-5304(7)).)

payment

district

result in a set-off against

other provision of that section requires

it

In fact,

either.

Section 19-5304 provides that, “The existence of a policy 0f insurance covering the Victim’s loss
shall not absolve the defendant

0f the obligation to pay

restitution.”

LC.

§

19-5304(2).

courts have repeatedly interpreted this provision as requiring the defendant to

make

restitution to the Victim notwithstanding the fact that the Victim has received funds

insurance

company

t0

compensate for the same

167, 898 P.2d 615, 626 (Ct. App.

loss.

E, gg, State V. Gardiner,

Idaho

full

from an

127 Idaho 156,

1995) (holding that “pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-5304(2), the

existence of an insurance policy covering the Victim’s loss does not absolve a defendant of the

obligation to pay restitution,” notwithstanding that the Victim

same

loss

by an

insurer); State V. Fortin,

may have been compensated

124 Idaho 323, 328, 859 P.2d 359, 364

(Ct.

for the

App. 1993)

(holding that evidence of insurance payments to the Victim for losses suffered as a result 0f the

defendant’s criminal conduct

was

irrelevant

Where

statute

mandated

restitution for

economic

loss

notwithstanding any policy of insurance); State V. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 299, 160 P.3d 451,
that “the district court could

456

(Ct.

ﬁlll

amount 0f the economic

App. 2007) (noting

loss

award the directly—injured Victim the

even though an insurance company had already paid the

directly—injured Victim for the loss”).
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Johnson argues that these cases are inapplicable because they involved payments from the
Victim’s insurer or

some other

source, while this case involves a

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-21.)

insurer.

payment from the defendant’s

But Section 19-5304(2) does not distinguish between a

Victim’s insurer and the defendant’s insurer and, Whether the payment

insurer or the defendant’s insurer, requiring the defendant to

pay

is

restitution,

from the Victim’s

notwithstanding any

policy of insurance, furthers the “deterrent and rehabilitative aspects 0f Victim restitution.”

M,

140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710

A restitution requirement

facilitates

(Ct.

m

App. 2004).

by confronting the defendant

rehabilitation

With the consequences 0f his 0r her criminal conduct and forcing the defendant to
accept ﬁnancial responsibility for the resulting harm. Restitution orders also
promote public safety by exacting a “price” for the crime, which may deter the

defendant and others from such offenses.
State V. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 816,

932 P.2d 936, 939

not served, or are not serve as effectively,

liability for the

harm

if

(Ct.

a defendant can escape any personal ﬁnancial

t0 the Victim through the application

of a pre-existing insurance policy.

For similar reasons, Johnson’s reliance on Hamilton
17-18.)

App. 1997). Those purposes are

is

unavailing. (Appellant’s brief, pp.

In Hamilton, the Court 0f Appeals required that a restitution

compensate for the amount the Victim received from the defendant in a

award be adjusted
civil settlement.

t0

Li. at

942-43, 935 P.2d at 205-06. But the settlement amount in Hamilton was paid by the defendant,
not an insurer. Li. Because the amount already received by the Victim was from the defendant,
not an insurer, the defendant

was confronted With

the full ﬁnancial consequences 0f his criminal

conduct and forced to take ﬁnancial responsibility for them through the combination of the
settlement he paid and a restitution award for the remaining economic loss.

the insurance

payment against Johnson’s

restitution liability,

Here, by crediting

Johnson would avoid Virtually

all

ﬁnancial responsibility for his criminal conduct despite the fact that Section 19-5304(2) provides
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that

to

an insurance policy that covers the Victim’s loss does not absolve Johnson “0f the obligation

pay restitution.”

Nor does

I.C. § 19-5304(2).

Section 19-5304(13) suggest that Johnson’s restitution liability should be

(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.) That provision states that where there are multiple Victims,

reduced.

by amounts received by

the restitution paid to the directly injured Victim should be reduced

directly injured Victim

“if there is

from those other Victims. LC.

more than one

constitutes a Victim

(1) Victim.”

under the

statute, that

that case, his insurer, as a Victim,

the assumption that the defendant’s insurer

would not reduce Johnson’s

would be

applies

In

restitution liability.

entitled t0 restitution for the

amount paid

t0

Mr.

Johnson’s argument would merely redirect a portion 0f the amount he was ordered t0

Knight.

pay

Even on

Id.

The provision only

§ 19-5304(13).

the

in restitution, not reduce that

Next, even

restitution liability

if

it

amount.

were appropriate under some circumstances

by an amount paid by

that the district court

abused

its

his insurer to the Victim,

discretion

by concluding

that

t0 reduce a defendant’s

Johnson has not established

he failed to show that

it

was

appropriate t0 do so here. Johnson did not establish below What portion, if any, of the insurance

payment was

to

compensate Mr. Knight for the same harm that was recoverable as economic loss

through restitution.

Absent such a showing, the

district court acted

within

its

discretion

by

refusing t0 provide any set-off, even if it could have done so under Section 19-5304.

A

settlement 0r insurance

to the extent that the

restitution.

restitution

payment may provide a

payment compensates

As Hamilton makes

clear,

for the

set-off with respect to restitution only

same economic

losses recoverable through

even Where a set-off is available for a settlement payment,

remains available for losses that are covered by the restitution statute and for Which

the settlement did not compensate the Victim.

Hamilton, 129 Idaho
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at

942-43, 935 P.2d at 205-

O6 (holding

that Victim

because some, but not

was

all,

some, but not

entitled to

all,

0f

district court’s restitution

0f the Victim’s economic loss was covered by a

award
But

civil settlement).

insurance and settlement payments frequently cover or are intended t0 compensate for harms that
are not recoverable through restitution.

Section 19-5304 permits a Victim to recover lost wages

and medical expenses, for example, but not
0r emotional distress.”

economic

LC.

§

“less tangible

restitution),

may

as pain

may

Likewise, a Victim

19-5304(1)(a).

loss through restitution, State V. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 267,

(holding that Victim

and suffering

While a settlement payment

.

.

not recover for future

346 P.3d 279, 284 (2015)

may be

intended, in

may be

whole or

in part, to cover such

largely or entirely directed to

compensating the Victim for harms that are not recoverable through restitution proceedings.
that event, the insurance

.

only recover for then-existing, not prospective, economic loss through

Thus, an insurance payment 0r settlement

losses.

damage such

payment or settlement

is

In

largely 0r entirely irrelevant t0 the Victim’s

entitlement t0 restitution.

For that reason, prior to providing any
portion of a settlement or insurance payment

set-off,

the district court

was devoted

through restitution, as opposed t0 other harm.

to the

must determine what

economic

loss recoverable

Courts in other jurisdictions have placed the

burden 0n the defendant seeking a set-off t0 make that showing before the defendant

any

set—off.

ﬂ, gg,

State V. Walters, 591

N.W.2d

restitution);

United States

V.

Apr. 23, 2002) (same); Fore

People

V.

was

how much of the

prior

directed to compensation for losses recoverable through

Johnson, No. 00-40094-01-SAC, 2002

V. State,

entitled to

874, 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that

defendant seeking set-off from restitution had the burden to ﬁrst establish
settlement or insurance payment

is

WL

1162415,

at

*4 (D. Kan.

858 So. 2d 982, 987-90 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (same);

Vasquez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 39 (Cal. App. 2010) (same). This Court should impose
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the

same

rule.

“[T]he defendant ha[s] the strongest incentive to

litigate

be afforded during a restitution proceeding.” Walters, 591 N.W.2d
[also] in the best position t0

whether a setoff should

United States

V.

Sizemore, 850 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2017).

burden accords with the general requirement that where there

t0 the value

of the Victim’s economic

loss, the

is

an

initial

no evidence

E

Hamilton, 129 Idaho

at

t0 rebut” initial evidence regarding Victim’s

if any,

inaccurate 0r

economic

loss).

district court

could have determined

0f the insurance payment received by Mr. Knight was t0 compensate for losses

recoverable through restitution and

restitution hearing,

for

is

943, 935 P.2d at 206 (holding that defendant “offered

Johnson provided n0 evidence below from Which the

how much,

showing as

defendant has the burden t0 present evidence t0

rebut that showing and provide reason t0 believe that the amount requested

inappropriate.

is

demonstrate that he has already compensated a Victim for a speciﬁc

loss in a civil proceeding.”

Finally, the

The “defendant

at 878.

how much was

t0

compensate for harms

that

Mr. Knight’s attorney argued that he was not attempting

were

not.

At the

to recover for

harm

which Mr. Knight had already been compensated through the insurance payment because the

latter

compensated him for pain and

for lost wages,

23, L. 25

—

is

which he could not pursue through

Which he was not seeking through

p. 24, L. 10; p. 25, Ls. 7-19.)

restitution hearing

determine

suffering,

restitution.

to consider the insurance

t0

as pain

and

suffering,

0f course, While the

cannot allocate.” (R.,

p. 125.) But,

pain and suffering,

must determine Whether and

it

stated only that:

payments for non—economic

payment

compensate Mr. Knight for harms

like pain

— p.

loss.

which

at the

the Court cannot

Here the Victim asks

this

Court

in a restitution claim this

Court

district court

how much

“What

and

21, L. 19; p.

Johnson’s attorney did not address the issue

and, in subsequent brieﬁng,

any allocation

(TL, p. 20, L. 24

restitution,

cannot award restitution for

0f the insurance payment was t0

and suffering and future medical expenses, which are
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not compensable through restitution, before providing a set-off.

Johnson provided n0 argument

0r evidence on that topic whatever.

The

closest

Johnson comes

t0 providing

any argument or evidence 0n the topic

submitted a copy of the Release 0f A11 Claims signed by Mr. Knight.

document provides no

causes 0f action,

actions,

compensation and
all

known

property

p.127.)

help, however.

or

It

costs,

Johnson from

from Johnson

striking

way growing

There

Release what portion,

attributable t0

of the $100,000

is

Mr. Knight With his

simply no

wages, and any future costs, expense, 0r harms.

is

way

car.

t0 determine

“all

and
(R.,

lost

from the

compensation for Mr. Knight’s

harms not recoverable through

then—existing medical expenses, as opposed t0 other

That

out of any and

damages, including pain and suffering,

all

by

0f services, expenses,

future anticipated or unanticipated personal injuries

provides a blanket release for

if any,

(R., pp. 127-28.)

releases

loss

consequential damages 0n account 0f or in any

resulting 0r t0 result”

is, it

appears t0 be a form.

demands, damages,

claims,

unknown, present or

damage
That

all

It

is

In addition to the extremely broad language of the Release indicating that

it

was not

restitution.

in

any way

limited t0 or directed speciﬁcally at Mr. Knight’s then-existing medical expenses, the $100,000

payment was not even adequate—setting aside pain and suffering 0r any
expenses—to cover Mr. Knight’s medical
Because Johnson

was

t0

failed t0

show how much,

compensate for the $101,665.64 in medical

that could not

be recovered as

restitution,

the district court properly exercised

at

bills at the time,

828 (holding that

district court

its

which

if any,

bills,

future medical

totaled $101,665.64.

of the $100,000 insurance payment

and not

to

compensate for other harm

he failed to establish an entitlement to any set—off and

discretion t0 refuse t0 apply one.

did not abuse

its

discretion

E

Sizemore, 850 F.3d

by refusing

t0 offset “general

settlements that were never speciﬁcally designated to a particular category 0f loss” against

33

restitution

award

for speciﬁc expenses); Vasquez, 119 Cal. Rptr.

3d

at

398-40 (holding that

settlement did not require set-off to restitution award where defendant

made n0 showing

regarding amount 0f settlement attributable to expenses recoupable through restitution);

591 N.W.2d

at

restitution as

it

878-79 (same). Because the
did, this

district court

acted within

its

civil

m,

discretion in ordering

Court should afﬁrm.

CONCLUSION
The
If this

state respectﬁllly requests that this

Court determines that the

obligation

by some or

all

district

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s restitution order.

court should have reduced Johnson’s restitution

0f his insurer’s payment t0 Mr. Knight,

this

Court should remand for

the district court t0 determine an appropriate restitution award.
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